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To get right to the point:'
(1) Professor Alexander first wonders how I can urge a smoking-out
conception of strict scrutiny while still supporting affirmative action programs
that would fail strict scrutiny. "If [such programs] failed strict scrutiny....
does that not demonstrate that they were unconstitutionally motivated?"2 The
answer is no-no more than a speed limit's inability to survive strict scrutiny
proves that it was unconstitutionally motivated. Nearly all laws would fail
strict scrutiny. That is why strict scrutiny must be an exceptional test, triggered
only when there are powerful grounds for suspecting an impermissible
purpose.'
(2) Professor Alexander's second question is, "What legislative purposes
are unconstitutional?" 4 He seems to want a complete list; if so, I cannot
satisfy his request. My aim was to show that equal protection jurisprudence
must confront this difficult question. I do say, on the basis of the Fourteenth
Amendment's paradigm cases, that state action is unconstitutional if it
purposefully imposes an inferior caste status on any group. Professor
Alexander suggests that this principle would be confounded by a statute
banning blacks from "high social positions" if the lawmakers had been sincere
utilitarians, motivated solely by concern over white pain at black success.5
This objection mistakenly supposes that an illegitimate purpose is somehow
1. As the Journal has limited this reply to two pages, I will not be able to give Professor Alexander's
characteristically incisive remarks the full consideration they mcrit.
2. Larry Alexander, Affirmative Action and Legislative Purpose, 107 YALE L. 2679 (1998)
(correspondence).
3. This triggering function was supposed to be the point of suspect class doctrine, according to which
a law singling out (say) blacks for adverse treatment raised so powerful a suspicion of improper purpose
that only the most exacting showing of necessity could dispel that suspicion. Today, the Court has in effect
made whites a suspect class, without ever acknowledging that this result contradicts everything the Court
used to say about the criteria for suspect class status. But Professor Alexander asks why. if a suspicion of
improper purpose can arise from "circumstantial evidence." we should ever "resort to artificial evidentiary
tests" like strict scrutiny. Id. at 2680. The answer is that the "artificial" test is a sensible judicial means of
resolving the suspicion. If a prosecutor has used peremptories to eliminate all black veniremen. a court
might demand a special demonstration of necessity as to each strike, setting a standard of review so high
that most peremptories could not meet it. The point of this strict scrutiny would not be to permit the state
to justify purposeful race-based exclusion. It would be to give the judiciary a practical means to smoke out
purposeful race-based exclusion, precisely where the "circumstantial evidence" had raised a sufficiently high
degree of suspicion that such purposeful exclusion had taken place.
4. Id. at 2680.
5. Id. at 2681.
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erased or washed clean by the presence of a putatively legitimate further
motive (or "ultimate" purpose). A law deliberately barring blacks from "high
positions" is quintessentially a law purposefully inflicting an inferior caste
status on blacks. It is hence unconstitutional-period. The lawmakers' motives
are irrelevant.
6
(3) Professor Alexander "save[s]" his "most important" question for last:
"Why should the constitutionality of a law ... ever turn on the purposes for
which it is enacted?"7 This is indeed an interesting question, but happily not
of an intricacy proportioned to its interest. The answer is: because the
Fourteenth Amendment at its core concerns invidious discrimination, and such
discrimination at its core involves purpose. Would we find invidious
discrimination if a particular ethnic group had not a single member on any
professional basketball team? I think not-unless this group were shown to
have been purposefully excluded. 8
Finally, Professor Alexander hypothesizes a situation in which "both sides
in a legislature-those for law A and those against it-are acting for improper
purposes." 9 Might not this lead, he asks, to the absurd conclusion "that both
the existence of law A and its absence would be unconstitutional"?"0 As
Professor Alexander well knows, this conundrum raises difficult problems in
figuring out how to understand a law's purpose. He may think these problems
are insuperable; I do not. One solution might be for courts to ask what purpose
or purposes a reasonable citizen would impute to the law. Another might be
for courts to presume a constitutional purpose in almost all cases, except when
certain potent criteria of suspect purpose are present, in which case heightened
means-ends scrutiny would apply. Sound familiar? Having begun by dismissing
strict scrutiny as "artificial," Professor Alexander concludes by despairing at
precisely the kind of problem to which strict scrutiny is an answer.
6. According to Professor Alexander, my basic position on purpose in equal protection law (i.e., that
the unconstitutionality of a law charged with discrimination must turn on the existence of an invidious
purpose) does "not square with lots of-I dare say most of-Supreme Court jurisprudence." Id. at 2683.
This conclusion would be very surprising if true, given that my position is virtually a quotation from that
jurisprudence. Professor Alexander neglects to mention what the Court has repeatedly affirmed: the "basic
equal protection principle," Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976), that "an invidious purpose
must be adduced to support a claim of unconstitutionality," City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 63 n. 10
(1980) (plurality opinion). The Court cannot abandon this principle without jeopardizing the entire line of
disparate impact cases. Yet, as Alexander agrees, the Court has dishonored this principle in its affirmative
action opinions.
7. Alexander, supra note 2, at 2683.
8. To be sure, if all "we care about" is the effectuation of free-market-social-welfare liberalism, see
Alexander, supra note 2, at 2684 & n.20, then we will not "care about" invidious racial purposes as such.
The Fourteenth Amendment, however, did not enact Dworkin's Empire or Rawls's Theory. See RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). It laid down a commitment
wh'nse central meaning is that the nation never again will tolerate any state action deliberately imposing
on one race a degraded status or second-class citizenship. Such racial discrimination requires at a minimum
a distinction made on account of race, and this on account of is a matter of purpose.
9. Alexander, supra note 2, at 2684 n.21.
10. Id.
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